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Abstract
The paper investigates academic wage formation inside Michigan
State University and develops tools in order to detect the presence
of possible superstars. We model wage distributions using a hybrid
mixture formed by a lognormal distribution for regular wages and
a Pareto distributions for higher wages, using a Bayesian approach,
particularly well adapted for inference in hybrid mixtures. The pres-
ence of superstars is detected by studying the shape of the Pareto
tail. Contrary to usual expectations, we did found some evidence
of superstars, but only when recruiting Assistant Professors. When
climbing up the wage ladder, superstars disappear. For full profes-
sors, we found a phenomenon of wage compression as if there were a
higher bound, which is just the contrary of a superstar phenomenon.
Moreover, a dynamic analysis shows that many recruited superstars
did not fulll MSU expectations as either they were not promoted
or left for lower ranked universities.
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1 Introduction
Education internationalisation fosters universities to endorse more strate-
gic behaviours. In the long race for best rankings, universities compete
across the world for top professors and higher level students. In this com-
petition, European universities might consider that it is hard to compete
with the best Anglo-Saxon universities (see e.g. Jacobs and Van Der Ploeg
2006), because of dierences between legal systems and opportunities for
wage negotiation. Some European Universities would like to push toward
a more American style of management, with higher tuition fees, possibility
of higher wages for top academics even if this might imply more insecure
labour contracts and more competition for top positions. We should re-
member that in most European countries professors are paid according to
a grid taking into account seniority and rank while in the U.S academic
wages depend on a negotiation process between the applicant academic
and his/her recruiting university. However, dierences might not be so se-
vere because many American universities are public with a tight budget
constraint and there are evidences that their wages are signicantly lower
than in private universities (see e.g. AAUP 2007). These wage restrictions
do not prevent some public US universities like Berkeley or UCLA of being
ranked among the top US universities.
Attracting the best academics is an attempt for universities to shore
up their prestige (see Altbach et al. 2009). In this context, the American
system can be considered as being the best to provide higher nancial
incentives. The question we would like to address in this paper is to know
if this system is really ecient in attracting, but also in keeping, the best
academics? To answer this question, we shall consider the case of a large
public US university, the Michigan State University (MSU). This choice is
motivated by two factors. First MSU is a large public university. So it
experiences the limitations of a public institution, making it comparable
to the limitations of European public universities. Second, its wages and
some extra characteristics are publicly available.
An important literature has focused on the strategic behaviour adopted
by universities. On the one hand, because of the external competition ex-
isting between them, universities want to attract the best academics on the
market. To achieve this goal, they have to provide high enough incentives
to lead an academic to choose their university rather than their competi-
tors. On the other hand, once they have been recruited, academics face
internal competition with the other insiders. They will engage with energy
in this competition, provided the rewarding price is high enough. Various
theories have been developed to explain wage formation in this context,
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with tournament theory for internal promotion (Lazear and Rosen 1981)
and superstar theory (Rosen 1981) for external competition. The tourna-
ment theory sees the market as a tournament where individuals are not
paid according to their marginal productivity, but according to their rank
in the tournament, while the theory of superstars corresponds to an econ-
omy where there is a concentration of very large rewards among very few
superstars. Are these two policy instruments ecient for recruiting and
keeping good academics and does it exist other instruments at work as
various types of labour contracts?
Since the landmark paper of Stephan (1996), a lot of changes have
occurred in the organisation and recruiting processes of American univer-
sities. The traditional trilogy of Assistant, Associate and Full professors
is no longer the dominant rule, even if it still concerns a large part of the
academic sta. Macfarlane (2011) details the new notion of unbundling
where the traditional tasks of academics, i.e. administration, teaching and
research, are split between dierent actors. The unbundling allows univer-
sities to pay lower wages to a whole range of academics who are not engaged
in research, but who perform mainly a teaching and assistance duty. With
this job dierentiation, universities are able to concentrate more funds on
their recruiting eort for top academics. But also, the tenure system is be-
coming in competition with xed term contacts, with the underlying idea
that academics recruited on this new type of risky contracts, with possibly
higher wages, might be brighter and more productive.
Universities have thus three policy instruments for recruiting and keep-
ing top academics: Two direct instruments of wage dierentiation with
tournaments and superstars and one indirect instrument with unbundling.
After showing the existence of tournaments and unbundling using the Michi-
gan State University data base for 2006-2007, we shall focus our attention
on the detection of superstars, using the three usual statuses of Assistant,
Associate and Full professors. We show that the phenomenon is quite dif-
ferent, depending on the status which is considered. Eciency of a policy
will be judged on the capacity of the university to keep the superstars it
has recruited. For that purpose, we shall rst use a second data base for
2012-2013 that allows us to study individual trajectories and some web
search in order to nd where go those who have decided to leave MSU.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the modern theo-
ries of wage formation, the tournament theory of Lazear and Rosen (1981)
and the superstar theory of Rosen (1981). They represent orthogonal di-
mensions, the time dimension of promotions for tournaments, the horizon-
tal dimension to explain wage inequality within a given status. Section
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3 presents the MSU databases and describes the dierent proles of our
academic population, the existence and extent of unbundling, the impor-
tance of xed term contracts compared to the tenure track system. We
also test the usual human capital approach to wage formation and show its
limitation in the case of academic wages. As a byproduct, we verify the
tournament theory for Assistant, Associate, full and Endowed Professors.
Section 4 introduces our model of superstar wage detection which is a hy-
brid mixture of a lognormal and a Pareto distributions. A regular wage is
supposed to have a lognormal distribution while a superstar wage should
corresponds to a Pareto distribution with a much longer tail. The presence
of superstars is equivalent to greater inequality in the Pareto member than
in the lognormal member. We test this assumption in a Bayesian framework
which is well adapted for inference in mixtures of distributions, especially in
the case of Pareto distributions. Section 5 presents our ndings concerning
the presence of superstars and the eciency of university strategy to keep
them. This will concern two colleges: Medicine and Business-Economics.
The last section concludes.
2 Academic Wages Formation
According to the neoclassical theory, workers are paid at their marginal
productivity and also according to their human capital. Here, we focus our
attention on the academic market which is a very dierent market as the
production associated to academic work is quite dicult to dene and to
measure precisely, in particular its productivity. New wage formation theo-
ries were developed especially to explain high wages. They are pertinent to
explain the system of promotion and to understand the possible presence
of very high wages for a minority of top academics.
2.1 From Classical...
The human capital approach links the life-cycle of earnings to the accumu-
lation of human capital over time (Mincer 1958, Becker 1964). It explains
how individuals invest in themselves before entering the labour market to
increase their skills, their productivity and thus their expected wage. A rst
attempt to test for the human capital approach is the well-known Mincer
equation as reviewed for instance in Lemieux (2006). This model explains
the logarithm of income y as a function of years of schooling S and years
of experience E:
log(y) = log(y0) + rS + β1E + β2E
2.
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The constant term y0 represents the level of income of an individual without
experience and education. Return to education is measured with r.
However the production of knowledge and its reward system is more
complex than what the human capital model assumes. Throughout the
literature, authors agree on the specic aspect of the academic market.
Since the 80s, an important concern was to found ways to measure aca-
demics productivity. As underlined in Hamermesh et al. (1982), the aca-
demic market concerns individuals that are located far from each other, but
who participate together in the production of knowledge. In this context, a
pertinent measure of productivity should take into account the inuence of
a researcher on his colleagues, namely citations. Previously, Katz (1973),
Hansen et al. (1978) proposed as a productivity measurement to use the
number of supervised dissertations, books, articles and excellent articles
published by the author. They highlighted the importance of the qual-
ity of the academic degree (related to the ranking of the university where
graduated), the gender (women are less paid), the department (humanities
professors are signicantly less paid than those in other departments) as
wage determinants.
2.2 ...to Modern Theories
The tournament theory, developed in Lazear and Rosen (1981), sees the
labour market as a contest where individuals are not paid according to
their marginal productivity, but to their rank in the tournament. The
remuneration is determined for each worker relatively to his/her position
compared to other workers. It assumes a competition to attain the top
positions and might lead to an over-reward at the highest ranks in order to
provide adequate incentives over workers' lifetime to reach the top positions
and win the prize. An important point induced by this theory is that
as one moves up in the hierarchical ladder, the prize increases in a non-
proportional way: the wage gap is higher and higher as one climbs up the
ladder in order to produce more and more incentives. We verify that point
for Assistant, Associate and Full professors.
Sabatier (2012) has studied the promotion mechanism in the case of
France. She describes the competition process between associate professors
(maître de conférence) who want to become full professors. Contrary to
what one could expect, she found that promotions have no signicant eect
on the productivity of the promoted, but the fact of not being promoted
leads to a decline in productivity due to discouragement.
Beside the internal competition between academics for promotion, uni-
versities compete in order to attract the best academics from outside. In
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this competition, a proposed high remuneration is seen as a mean to attract
best academics from outside, while high wages resulting from tournaments
were a way to keep the promoted insiders from leaving for a more attrac-
tive competitor. Both mechanisms might lead to an economy of superstars.
The superstar theory focuses on top position workers with very high wages.
First developed in Rosen (1981), superstars are dened as a small number
of people that earn enormous amounts of money and dominate the activity
in which they engage. Why do a small number of workers dominates and
thus earn more money than others? The answer given by Rosen is talent.
He explains that the output is concentrated on the very few who are the
most talented. He gives the example of textbooks in economics: the supply
in the market is huge, but only a few of these books are best-sellers. Focus-
ing on the academic market, he explains that this proportion corresponds
to the relatively small part of researchers who publishes the majority of
papers and who experiences the highest number of citations. Nevertheless,
if the market wage distribution is skewed in favour of the most talented
workers, the increase of wages according to talent is far from proportional
as small dierences in talent might imply high dierences in remuneration
at top positions. The reason is that lesser talent is a poor substitute for
greater talent. This point is also developed in Gabaix and Landier (2008)
where they found that if the dierence between CEO's pay is high, it is
clearly not the case between their talents. However in Adler (1985) this
dierence in salary can also occur between people with the same talent.
An analogy to the academic market could be made to understand why
some professors with the same experience and the same number of years
in their grade are not paid the same wage. We shall see below how this
phenomenon of superstar can or cannot characterise the academic market
and universities behaviour.
If both theories explain the formation of wages, they provide comple-
mentary dimensions. The tournament theory explains the gap between
each layer, while simultaneously inside of each layer, we may nd a su-
perstar eect. The tournament theory has a broader view on the whole
distribution, while the superstar theory focuses only on the right hand of
the distribution. These theories of academic wage formation are coherent
with the multiplicity of academic activities pointed out by Stephan (1996):
a risky part with research and a more traditional part with teaching and
administrative services. However, the recent appearance of para-academics
as underlined in Macfarlane (2011) leads to a splitting of the tasks that
academics are in charge of, and thus should inuence the wage determina-
tion process, which forces us to focus more deeply and with a larger view
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on the mechanisms at work.
2.3 The Changing American System: Unbundling and
the Tenure
The traditional functions of academics are teaching, research and admin-
istrative services. This is a worldwide recognised denition. However,
Macfarlane (2011) points out that under diverse forces such as massi-
cation of higher education, development and use of new technologies for
teaching, a new culture of management due to international competition,
these three complementary roles have a tendency to unbundle. It means
that specialised roles and functions associated to new types of positions are
appearing in universities: specialists, instructors, teaching assistants and
research assistants. A modern and successful institution of higher educa-
tion has to provide well integrated support services to students, such as
placement ocers, librarians, computer scientists. These new functions re-
quire specialised positions. If the traditional trilogy of Assistant, Associate
and Full professors still constitutes the majority of the academic members,
we see on one side of the wage distribution, the development of temporary
teaching assistants with no research assignment and a low pay. Moreover,
inside the academic members, some new entrants are proposed xed term
contracts with possibly higher wages than those proposed in the tenure
track system. We shall nd this dichotomy in the Michigan data base.
The unbundling has a major inuence when considering the eciency of
wage determination inside American universities. It frees up extra budget
for recruiting superstars. It also frees up a superstar of some of her/his time
consuming activities so that he/she can focus more time on what is really
important for a University prestige. However this strategy, if it benets to
superstars, could also put a downward pressure on regular academic wages
and creates precarious jobs, namely those of the unbundled.
Another important aspect specic to the American academic system is
the tenure (contrary to continental Europe where most of the time tenure
is granted right at the beginning). Being tenured ensures for a professor
an appointment that can not be terminated without a just cause and this
until retirement. But some recent literature seems to be sceptic on the will
of universities to keep this system. Zemsky (2008) nds that the percent of
tenured faculty has declined in the past thirty years and predicts that the
tenure system might end in the future. Also Craft et al. (2016) analyse the
cost of tenure in term of satisfaction, after that some US states have tried
to remove the tenure system in their public universities. Using the variable
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of satisfaction at work, the authors conclude that to achieve the same level
of satisfaction without tenure, teachers' salaries would have to be increased
between $50 000 and $100 000 on average. Besides, these universities would
no longer be competitive to attract goods academics. Finally, the tenure
system saves money from the state budget.
3 The Michigan State University Databases
In the US, public universities have a legal obligation to publish the wages
of their members. The Michigan State University (MSU), which is one the
biggest public university in the US (50 000 students), provides a series of
particularly interesting wage data bases, for dierent years. We have chosen
to analyse the le provided for the academic year 2006-2007.
1
It contains
6 055 observations, concerning 4 649 dierent faculty and academic sta
members, documenting 11 variables including wages, but also the type
of associated contract, the years of experience, years in rank, the name
of the individuals, their department and faculty and their title.
2
Thus,
this university not only complies to its legal obligation, but also provides
information on a number of key concepts in wage theory. It is thus an ideal
tool for studying academic wage formation and for testing some of the
stereotypes that European academics might have on US academic salaries.
This data base does not contain all the members of the University as for
instance cooks, accountants, social workers are excluded, which means all
those who are not directly connected to either an academic work or an
executive position. A quite similar le, but slightly less detailed, is available
for the academic year 2012-2013. This le is very useful to analyse the
dynamic of wages, as we can merge these two les into a panel data set.
3
The formed panel covers a gap of six years, which is the period after which
an assistant professor should get the tenure. Concerning the availability of
these data, we must note that less and less information is available for the
more recent years. For instance, names were excluded after 2015, which
precludes the building of a panel for the more recent years.
1
The le we use is available at https://archive.org/details/MsuFacultySalaryList2008-
2009.
2
The dierence between 6 055 and 4 649 is due to the fact that the same individual
can occupy a position in two dierent departments.
3
We found this second le at https://spartanarchive.msu.edu/fedora/objects/msu-
uahc:UA.5.2-A.2016.0060.5/datastreams/PDFFile0/content
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3.1 Academics and their Labour Contracts
The Michigan State University could propose in 2006 six types of contracts
for faculty and academic sta members. There are the well-known Tenured
faculty (T), and the Tenure System (TS) for those not yet tenured. Apart
from this traditional system, there is also the Fixed term appointment
(N) that concerns a great number of assistant professors, some associate
professors and even some professors and endowed chairs.
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Table 1 regroups 3 002 professors, representing 50% of our sample. We
shall concentrate our attention on this sub-sample. The tenure track system
represents 84% of the academics. Fixed term contracts concern mainly
assistant professors, but are also used sometimes for higher positions. It is
of a particular interest to measure the inuence of this type of contract on
the level of wages inside a category and on wage dynamics.
Table 1: Various forms of academic contracts in 2006
Title N TS T Mean Gini C.V. Years
Salary in rank
Assistant Prof. 306 529 1 70 554 0.144 0.285 3.37
Associate Prof. 85 24 691 87 528 0.143 0.278 7.30
Full Professor 84 0 1110 115 253 0.134 0.250 12.68
Endowed Chair 8 0 164 164 440 0.105 0.193 13.21
Total 483 553 1 966 98 283 0.198 0.362 8.69
The average wage is increasing with the status, with an increasing gap.
However within inequality measured either by a Gini coecient or by a
coecient of variation is decreasing.
3.2 The Unbundling at Work
The 3 012 professors are confronted to 1 093 instructors, external educa-
tors, lecturers, specialists (to which we could add 707 visitors and research
associates). The wage range of these teaching assistants is much lower than
that of assistant professors, as seen from Table 2. Specialists and educators
have an important mean years in rank, showing that these categories do
not represent only temporary positions. With lower wages and 70% of xed
term contract, they complement the role of regular academics, executing
4
The other types of contract, the Continuing employment (C) and Continuing em-
ployment system (CE), seem to concern mainly the administrative sta. A marginal
system (concerning only 98 persons out of 6 055) is specially designed for the executive
management (EM). We have eliminated from Table 1 those statuses which concern only
10 professors.
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Table 2: The unbundling at work
Title C CE N Mean Gini Years
Salary in rank
Instructor 0 0 372 38 098 0.177 2.03
Educator 103 54 68 45 000 0.149 9.07
Lecturer 0 0 13 43 711 0.268 3.15
Specialist 118 43 322 58 866 0.182 7.18
Total 221 97 775 48 754 0.206 5.76
one of the three tasks that otherwise would had to be done by regular aca-
demics with a much higher wage. Thanks to their presence, a larger share
of the university budget can eventually be devoted to recruiting superstars.
3.3 The 2012-2013 Data Base and Wage Dynamics
The 2012-2013 data base is useful to study dynamics and see the conse-
quences of the wage policy.
5
Let us rst consider mobility between statuses
for academics. Starting from those who were present in 2006-2007, we can
dene for each category the probability of outing (to leave MSU), the prob-
ability to keep the same status, the probability to change of status. The
latter represents mainly a promotion, for instance receiving the tenure for
an assistant professor, or taking a managerial position. Other corresponds
in general to a diminishing activity such as Emeritus. We report those
probabilities in Table 3.
Table 3: Mobility of academics between 2006 and 2012
Title Assist Asso Prof Endowed Quit Executive Other
Assistant Prof. 0.244 0.349 0.010 0.000 0.366 0.022 0.009
Associate Prof. 0.004 0.474 0.254 0.006 0.197 0.065 0.001
Professor 0.000 0.000 0.583 0.042 0.259 0.091 0.026
Endowed Chair 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.607 0.242 0.084 0.039
Rows sum to one. Largest probabilities are in bold. The column Executive corre-
sponds to Advisors, Chair, Dean, Director, Presidence and Provost. The column
Other corresponds to Emeritus, Research Associate and Specialist. Not all categories
are represented in each row.
5
For analysing dynamics, we created a panel by merging our two data bases. This
panel was only used for the dynamic analysis and might create more duplicates with
respect to year 2007. Duplicates that can not be taken o without losing information.
In fact some academics may appear several times if they are engaged in dierent tasks
or have several college aliations.
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The probability to stay in the same position increases along the hierar-
chical ladder, while the probability for an individual to move downward is
nearly zero for all categories. An Assistant professor is slightly more likely
to leave than being promoted with a probability of exit equal to 0.366.
This might be due to the fact that they are more often hired under a xed
term contract than the other positions, a feature that we examine in detail
below. Associate professors are those with the lowest rate of exit, presum-
ably because they are those with the greatest promotion expectations. For
a professor, the greatest chance of inside promotion is to become execu-
tive. Hamermesh et al. (1982) underline the importance of administrative
positions to explain academic wage formation. They see it as an indirect
measure of productivity as "it enhances the teaching and research produc-
tivity of other faculty". They explain that a university has to reward these
tasks in order to create incentives for professors to engage in non-scholarly
pursuits. On the contrary, the possibility of getting an endowed chair is
much lower.
3.4 A Mincer Approach to Academic Wage Formation
We examine here inference results using a Mincer equation which measures
the impact of experience, also taking also into account various character-
istics such as the type of contract (tenure system or not) and the type of
discipline. As explained in Section 2, this model gives a very short expla-
nation for academic wage formation and fails to explain very high wages.
We have two solutions. We rst try to estimate a Mincer equation using
the unconditional quantile regression approach of Firpo et al. (2009) to see
if the life cycle model is one of the instrument used by the university to
x wages at both ends of the distribution. We show that this is not the
case. Clearly, there are other mechanisms at work that we try to explain
in section 4.
We consider the population of assistant, associate, full and endowed
professors with a total of 3 012 individuals for the academic year 2006-
2007.
6
We have the years of experience and the number of years in the
grade. We choose to use only the years in rank and not the years of ex-
perience. These two variables are highly correlated and we suspect that
the University managed to report data of a better quality for years in rank
(which it directly observes) than for years of experience. The number of
years of education is not important as all academics are supposed to have a
PhD degree. This rst equation allows us to detect the individuals who are
6
Emeritus were discarded because they are not part of the wage competition.
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away from the usual seniority explanation. So, in this equation we include
control variables for the dierent departments: Medicine, Agriculture, Eco-
nomics, Science, Education and Others. Humanities is used as the reference
department. We also add the title for professors: Endowed, Full, Associate.
Assistant is here treated as the reference category. The fact of having a
tenure or being in the tenure system (TS) is introduced while other types
of contracts is the reference. Finally we added a variable that qualify the
length of the contract over the year: a rst contract is appointment for the
Academic Year (9-months), while the alternative corresponds to an annual
basis (12-month). The annual basis is taken as reference.
We report in Table 4 inference results for the rst and the last decile of
our distribution q10 and q90 and for the median q50.
Table 4: Unconditional quantile regressions as a Mincer equation for log
academic wages
q10 (S.E) q50 (S.E) q90 (S.E)
Intercept 10.234∗∗∗ 0.034 10.948∗∗∗ 0.028 11.733∗∗∗ 0.045
Associate 0.296∗∗∗ 0.021 0.165∗∗∗ 0.017 0.052 ∗ 0.028
Professor 0.353∗∗∗ 0.022 0.617∗∗∗ 0.018 0.248∗∗∗ 0.029
Endowed 0.359∗∗∗ 0.035 0.767∗∗∗ 0.029 1.412∗∗∗ 0.048
Experience/10 0.004 0.025 0.086∗∗∗ 0.020 −0.001 0.033
Experience
2
/100 −0.006 0.007 −0.026∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.008 0.010
Tenured System 0.243∗∗∗ 0.024 0.082∗∗∗ 0.020 0.099∗∗∗ 0.033
Monthly Basis −0.049∗∗∗ 0.019 −0.188∗∗∗ 0.016 −0.216∗∗∗ 0.026
Medicine 0.520∗∗∗ 0.031 0.265∗∗∗ 0.026 0.123∗∗∗ 0.042
Economics 0.270∗∗∗ 0.029 0.189∗∗∗ 0.024 0.180∗∗∗ 0.039
Sciences 0.436∗∗∗ 0.029 0.162∗∗∗ 0.023 0.030 0.038
Other 0.393∗∗∗ 0.040 0.093∗∗∗ 0.033 −0.014 0.054
Agriculture 0.381∗∗∗ 0.029 0.093∗∗∗ 0.024 −0.024 0.039
Education 0.346∗∗∗ 0.039 0.087∗∗∗ 0.032 0.045 0.053
Adj. R
2 0.26 0.50 0.28
Nbr. Observations 3 012
Standard errors in parentheses, ***,**,* denotes statistical signicance at the 1%,
5%, 10% level.
When considering the median of the distribution, we nd very similar
results to those that would be obtained by a usual Mincer equation (not
reported here). However, there are large dierences at both ends of the
wage distribution where seniority no longer play any role, implying that
the main engine of the Mincer equation disappears. It could mean that
most of the experience eect is already captured by the statuses variables.
The increasing dierence in wages with respect to the status is more and
more marked as we move to higher quantiles, conrming the importance
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of tournaments and the results founds for instance in Coupé et al. (2003)
who considered all American universities, but only Economic departments.
The fact of being in the Tenure System is signicant for all types of wages,
but its impact is less of an advantage for median and higher quantiles.
So a high wage can accommodate with a xed term contract, but what
is important is to have a contract running over twelve months instead of
nine. The negative impact of a 9-month contract is more and more severe
as we climb up in the wage ladder. We have here an illustration of the wage
policy of the university.
Taking humanities as the reference, there is a strong inuence of de-
partments for wage formation both at the lower quantiles and around the
median. This inuence disappears for the highest quantiles, except for
Medicine and Economics. It could mean that most of the top wages are
concentrated in these two departments.
Unconditional quantile regression allowed a richer description of the
wage distribution, conrming once again that high wages determination
follows a particular scheme that can hardly be explained by the human
capital approach. However, the unconditional quantile regression produced
just a negative result, the dismissing of the human capital approach for high
wages. We need a specic model to describe the heterogeneity of academic
wage formation. As a conrmation of this point of view, the R2 of the
regression is much lower for extreme quantiles than for the median.
4 A Mixture Model for Explaining Academic
Wages
In the previous section, we have validated the tournament theory, but we
have shown that the human capital theory was not enough for explaining
the whole range of academic wages. There are specic mechanisms at work.
Inside each of the main three categories of professors (four when adding en-
dowed chairs), there is a large heterogeneity in wage formation. So the same
model, even a quantile regression cannot be used. The traditional tool for
disentangling heterogeneity is to use mixture of distributions. When for
the same status, wages obey to, say, two dierent logics, a mixture model
can help to disentangle the two underlying samples. A lognormal distribu-
tion can be used to model regular wages, those which could be explained
by a traditional Mincer equation. A Pareto distribution on the contrary
would depict the behaviour of superstar wages. Lydall (1959) for instance
explains that the Pareto distribution has been successful to characterise
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the right part of the wage distribution. The Pareto characterisation of high
salaries distribution was also developed later in Lydall (1968) where the
main purpose is to dene a standard distribution that will characterise in
a general way workers' earnings. This standard distribution turns out to
be a lognormal for the rst deciles and a Pareto for the very high wages.
The superstar theory was recently proposed in Atkinson (2008, Section 9
and Note 3, pages 93-95) for explaining the greater earning dispersion that
has occurred on the top of the earning distribution in many OECD coun-
tries. A fall in the Pareto coecient α would imply a distribution which
favours more the highest paid workers of the distribution and allows for
the appearing of a few observations with very high wages. Consequently,
a population that mixes regular academics and superstars should display
a wage distribution that can be represented by a mixture of a lognormal
density and a Pareto density. However, if the Pareto distribution is nec-
essary for representing a superstar wage formation, it does not necessarily
imply superstars. A Pareto member can be needed only because there is
an accumulation of wages just above a certain point determined by outside
competition. Do not forget that we are in a public university and there are
evidences in the literature that their wages are signicantly lower than in
private universities (see e.g. AAUP 2007). The meaning of the Pareto is
then much dierent if its parameter α is very high. There are superstars
only if α is low enough so as to imply more inequality in the Pareto mem-
ber than in the lognormal member. Let us detail rst the characteristics of
both processes and then see how they can be combined and compared.
7
4.1 Lognormal Wages
A random variableX is said to have a lognormal distribution if its logarithm
log(X) has a normal distribution. The probability density of the random
variable X is lognormal and its expression is:
fX(x;µ, σ) =
1
xσ
√
2pi
exp−(log x− µ)
2
2σ2
.
The cumulative distribution can be expressed as a function of the comple-
mentary error function:
P (X ≤ x) = FX(x;µ, σ) = 1
2
erfc
(
−(log x− µ)√
2σ
)
.
7
Details on these two distributions can be found in Cowell (2011).
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The rst two moments of a lognormal distribution are :
E[X ] = eµ+
1
2
σ2 , Var[X ] = (eσ
2 − 1)e2µ+σ2 .
The median is eµ and the mode eµ−σ
2
. The Gini coecient and the coe-
cient of variation are:
GLN = 2 ∗ Φ(
√
σ2/2)− 1, CVLN =
√
exp(σ2)− 1. (1)
The lognormal distribution appears in the context of the law of propor-
tionate eects of Gibrat (1930) (see also Mitzenmacher 2004 for a survey).
This process can be used to explain regular academic wage formation in-
side a given category, for instance when hiring an assistant professor. Let
us suppose that candidates have characteristics that vary over time and
among candidates according to a random variable Fj. If the wage of the
previously hired candidate was Xj−1, then the wage of the next hired can-
didate Xj will be a certain proportion (higher or lower) of the insider wage
Xj−1 with:
Xj = FjXj−1.
Taking the logs and using a recurrence, we have:
logXj = logX0 +
j∑
k=1
logFk.
Using the Central Limit Theorem, the distribution of Xj for j →∞ is the
lognormal distribution as the sum of independent random variables logFk
will tend to a normal distribution. The lognormal distribution corresponds
to the regular recruiting policy of the university, regular in the sense that
the university is recruiting academics of a similar quality.
4.2 Power Law and Pareto Wages
The Pareto model has heavier tails than those of densities belonging to
the exponential family and in particular of lognormal process. A random
variable X is said to have a Pareto distribution if:
P (X ≤ x) = FX(x;α, h) = 1− (x/h)−α , x > h, h > 0, α > 0.
The Pareto density is obtained by dierentiation:
f(x|α, h) = αhαx−(α+1)1(x > h),
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where 1(.) is the indicator function. h is a scale parameter and α a shape
parameter. The rst two moments are:
E(x) =
α
α− 1h Var(x) =
α
(α− 1)2(α− 2)h
2,
and exist only for α > 1 and α > 2 respectively. The Gini coecient and
the coecient of variation are:
GP =
1
2α− 1 , CVP =
1√
α(α− 2) , (2)
which exist only for α > 0.5 for the Gini and α > 2 for the coecient of
variation.
A Pareto process is well suited to describe wage competition on the
outside academic market for recruiting top academics. For top academics,
outside competition is xing a minimum wage h, below which it becomes
impossible to have access to this small part of the labour market. A small
variation in perceived quality lead to a set of possible wage classes dened
by hλj where λ > 1 and j corresponds to the jth class. If the probability of
moving from class i to class j, say pij depends only on the distance j − i,
then the wage distribution of the successively hired academics according to
this process will have a Pareto distribution. This mechanism leading to a
Pareto distribution for incomes dates back to Champernowne (1953). The
Pareto process shares however some similarities with the lognormal gener-
ative process. The sole dierence with the lognormal process comes from
the fact that there is a minimum bound h, as underlined in Mitzenmacher
(2004).
4.3 Bayesian Inference for Hybrid Mixtures
Inference in a mixture problem can be seen as an incomplete data problem.
Observation are the result from the mixing of dierent populations, each
being represented by a particular density indexed by a given parameter.
The trouble is that we do not know the origin of each observation. This
lack of knowledge makes the problem of inference dicult. We suppose that
we have only two sub-populations, a lognormal for lower wages in unknown
proportion p and Pareto for higher wages in proportion (1− p):
f(x) = pfΛ(x|µ, σ2) + (1− p)fP (x|α, h)
It is convenient at this stage to introduce a new random variable called Z
that will be associated to each observation xi and that will say if xi belongs
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to the rst component of the mixture zi = 1 (the lognormal component)
or to the second component of the mixture zi = 2 (the Pareto component).
This incomplete data representation, due to Diebolt and Robert (1994) is
especially convenient for Bayesian inference as it gives rise naturally to a
Gibbs sampler via data augmentation. Moreover, we have here a hybrid
mixture, including a Pareto member for which the support of the distribu-
tion depends on a parameter. We know from Bee et al. (2011) that the EM
algorithm does not work very well in this case. This is a second reason for
adopting a Bayesian approach.
In order to be able to propose an algorithm for making inference in this
mixture, we have rst to detail Bayesian inference for these two processes,
lognormal and Pareto. This is provided in Appendix A. Suppose that we
know the n values of z. Then conditionally on the value of z, we can
compute easily the following sucient statistics, rst for the lognormal
process:
n1(z) =
∑
1(zi = 1), (3)
x¯1(z) =
1
n1
∑
log xi × 1(zi = 1), (4)
s¯1(z) =
1
n1
∑
(log xi − x¯1(z))2 × 1(zi = 1), (5)
and second for the Pareto process:
n2(z) =
∑
1(zi = 2), (6)
x¯2(z) =
∑
log xi × 1(zi = 2), (7)
h(z) = min(x[zi = 2]). (8)
Using these sucient statistics, we can derive a posterior draw for each of
the parameter of the two members of the mixture that we can call θ
(j)
1 and
θ2(j) for the while. We can also estimate p as pˆ = n1/n. Knowing this, we
can draw a new vector of sample allocation z with probabilities for each
observation given by:
Pr(zi = 1|x, θ(j)) = pˆ× fΛ(xi|θ
(j)
1 )
pˆ× fΛ(xi|θ(j)1 ) + (1− pˆ)× fP (xi|θ(j)2 )
. (9)
We randomly allocate observation i to one of the two regime according to
a binomial experience with probability Pr(zi = 1|x, θ(j)). This is true when
h is xed and equal to the minimum of the sample. However, as soon as
h is random, it can take any value, and consequently a value greater than
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the minimum of the total sample. As the support of the Pareto depends
on the value of h, this means that not all observations can be randomly
allocated to the two components. All the observations that are lower than
h belong for sure to the lognormal component, while a xi > h belongs to
the lognormal with a probability p and to the Pareto component with a
probability (1 − p). A Gibbs sampler algorithm designed to get M draws
from the posterior density is provided in Appendix A. The collection of
these draws is called the Gibbs output. This is a matrix of M lines for
(µ(j), σ(j), h(j), α(j), p(j)) and it will be used to compute a large variety of
statistics. We are going to exploit these draws stored in a large matrix to
compute various statistics.
It is crucial to give a realistic prior information for h in this process. As
clearly stated in Ndoye and Lubrano (2014) (and in other papers devoted
to mixtures of Pareto densities), the presence of a Pareto component creates
a bump in the predictive density of the mixture. A plausible prior value
for h can be inferred from the shape of a non-parametric estimation of
the density. A totally unrealistic prior value for h can be eliminated by
checking visually the t of the model.
4.4 Testing for Superstars in a Bayesian Framework
The right tail of the lognormal density behaves very dierently from the
Pareto tail, just because the lognormal has got all its moments when the
Pareto might not have nite moments when α is too small. So usually the
lognormal tail will be below the Pareto tail. However, for large values of
σ and large values of α, the Pareto tail can be below the lognormal tail.
Being able to compare those tails is a matter of importance in order to
be able to detect the eective presence of superstars. In the presence of
superstars, the Pareto tail will be systematically above the lognormal tail.
What we observe is a mixture of two types of populations: lognormal for
regular academics, Pareto for potential superstars. Dierentiating the two
populations represents the rst step of our superstar identifying strategy.
Superstars will be those belonging only to the Pareto member. However,
the individuals belonging to that member are not necessarily superstars,
even though a Pareto member has to be added to the lognormal to depict
the whole distribution within a given status. Rosen (1981) sees superstars
as a small number of individuals between who a huge amount of money
is shared. Gabaix and Landier (2008) include a notion of dispersion in
this denition. One of the important characteristics of superstars is that a
small dierence in talent may lead to a huge dierence in reward leading
to a non proportionate wage increase as we climb up the wage distribution.
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As focusing on the top of the distribution we will gradually observe less
and less individuals with higher and higher wages. Empirically this hy-
pothesis can be endorsed through a dispersion analysis. In order to observe
superstars we have to nd higher inequalities in the second member of our
distribution. We nd a similar analysis in Atkinson (2008, Section 9 and
Note 3, pages 93-95) where high wages are modelled using a mixture of two
Pareto distributions with respective parameters α1 and α2. The second
member corresponds to superstars only if α2 < α1, which means also that
there is more inequality in the second member than in the rst member
as measured for instance by a Gini coecient. Here we have a lognormal
distribution for most academics and a Pareto for higher wages of possibly
superstar academics. By analogy with Atkinson (2008), we should have
more inequality in the Pareto member if the Pareto wages correspond to
a superstar phenomenon and less inequality in the reverse case. If there is
less inequality in the Pareto member, that would mean that above a certain
threshold h, there is a phenomenon of wage compression. This means that
universities are ready to pay a higher wage in order to attract and to keep
superstar academics, but up to a certain level. Let us now examine the
tools necessary to explore this assumption.
Bayesian inference will be of a great help both for comparing inequality
between the two members of the mixture and as a consequence inequality
between the two sub-populations and allocating observations between the
two members. This will be be done using the Gibbs output.
The rst task is to compare two coecients of variation or more precisely
to evaluate the probability that one coecient is greater than the other.
This is an easy task as we have the analytical expression of these coecients
for the two processes as given in (1) and (2). Let us dene the two quantities
having as an argument the j draw of the Gibbs output:
CV
(j)
P =
1√
α(j)(α(j) − 2)
CV
(j)
LN =
√
exp(σ(j)2)− 1
Then we can estimate the posterior probability that there is more inequality
in the Pareto member than in the lognormal member as an empirical mean:
Pr(CVPa > CVΛ =
1
M
∑
1(CV
(j)
Pa > CV
(j)
Λ ),
where 1(.) is the indicator function equal to 1 if the condition is veried
and equal to 0 otherwise. The same probability could be evaluated using
the Gini coecient, however the latter puts more weight on the middle of
a distribution and thus less adapted to detect superstars.
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If we manage to have a xed allocation of the observations between the
two regimes, it will be easier to derive some of their characteristics in term
of type of labour contract with the important question to know which is the
major type of contract for super stars and what is the dynamics of these
two sub-populations. Let us suppose that we have computed the posterior
expectation of the parameters, noted (µ¯, σ¯2, h¯, α¯, p¯). Conditionally on these
values, we can recompute the posterior probability (9) of each observation
to belong to the lognormal regime 1 as:
Pr(zi = 1|x, θ¯) = p¯× fΛ(xi|θ¯1)
p¯× fΛ(xi|θ¯1) + (1− p¯)× fP (xi|θ¯2)
. (10)
We decide to allocate observation i to the lognormal regime if its probability
(10) to belong to that regime is greater than its probability to belong to the
Pareto regime. Once this allocation is done, we can compute the proportion
of each type of contract for each sub-sample. Using the panel dimension of
our two data sets, we can then compute the respective percentage of those
who were promoted with their wage increase, the percentage of those who
left Michigan.
8
5 Detecting Superstar Wages among Academics
We apply our mixture model to each category of regular academics in order
to detect the presence or not of superstars. This is done by comparing in-
equality between the two members, lognormal and Pareto, using the draws
from the posterior density of the parameters. We then identify which in-
dividuals belong to the lognormal member and which belong to the Pareto
member as a by-product of inference. Once this sample separation is made,
we look at the type of contract which is associated to each type of pop-
ulation. Using the 2012 data set, we shed light on the dynamics of the
individuals, keeping the same status, being promoted or leaving MSU. For
tting our hybrid mixture, we use prior information which is detailed and
justied in the appendix, especially for h0.
8
It is also possible to follow another route which is certainly more dicult to explain
for the reader who is not familiar with Bayesian inference. For each draw of the Gibbs
sampler, we get a vector value z which corresponds to a sample separation between the
lognormal and the Pareto members. For each draw, we can then determine the status
of each individual within these two sub-populations. By averaging at the end of the
Gibbs sampler, we get an evaluation of the number of each type of labour contract for
the lognormal and for the Pareto members. We can also study dynamics in the same
way.
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5.1 Assistant Professors
When tting our two-member mixture with h0 = 105, we get an estimated
mean wage of the lognormal member of $66 821 with a rather small standard
deviation of $570. The mean wage of a recruited assistant professors goes
up to the much higher value of $125 076 with a larger standard deviation
of $5 040 for the Pareto member (roughly twice the previous gure, in
fact a posterior ratio of 1.9 between the two). The posterior proportion
of high wages is 7%. There is thus a clear will to recruit two dierent
types of population with two dierent types of wages. The t of the model
is quite good as the posterior Hellinger distance is 0.075 (0.006).
9
Figure
1 represents the posterior predictive density (full line) compared to the
histogram and a non-parametric estimate of the wage density (dashed line).
The dierence of wage inequality between the two members is well seen
when using the coecient of variation, we get 0.209 (0.006) for the log-
normal member and the much higher value 0.276 (0.058) for the Pareto
member. The probability for the second member to display more inequal-
ity is 0.91. We can conclude that there is a superstar phenomenon when
recruiting some assistant professors.
9
Using Lubrano and Protopopescu (2004), we compare a non-parametric estima-
tion of the density fˆ(x) with our estimated mixture model fM (x|θ) using the squared
Hellinger distance D2
H
(θ)2 = 1 − ∫ √fˆ(x)fM (x|θ)dx. If our model ts the data in a
satisfactory way, the distance between the two densities should be small. We use a ker-
nel density estimation for the non-parametric estimation of fˆ(x). The integral of the
Hellinger distance is estimated numerically for the M draws of θ, so that we obtain M
values DHi . We can compute the posterior probability that DH < 0.10 or DH < 0.05
and then select the model with the most satisfactory probability.
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Figure 1: Posterior predictive wage density for Assistant professors
How is this type of wage formation implemented in term of labour con-
tract? Once we have inference results for the mixture, we can allocate each
individual to one of the members on the basis of the posterior expectation
of the parameters. We give our results in Table 5. Most of the assistant
Table 5: Contract types among recruited Assistant Professors
Contract LogNorm Pareto LogNorm Pareto
Numbers Percentage
N 273 34 0.35 0.59
TS 506 24 0.65 0.41
Total 779 58 1.00 1.00
N means xed term contract, T means tenured, TS means
tenure system, not yet tenured.
professors are hired with a lognormal wage and among them a proportion of
65% are on a Tenured System contract. But their mean recruiting wage is
quite low ($66 821). Among the 837 recruited Assistant professors, 58 had
a much higher Pareto wage ($125 076) at the cost of a xed term contract
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for 59% of them. (The proportion of xed term contract is 37% for the
total population of assistant professors).
Is this recruiting policy successful? Does the university manages to keep
the superstars it has recruited, mainly on xed term contracts? We can
answer this question, using our next data set. For each individual, we have
looked at his/her status in 2012-2013. We then compute the proportion
of these individuals that have kept the same status, which means that
they are still assistant professors in the academic year 2012-2013, those
who were promoted and nally those who left MSU. We also compute
a mean wage increase over the period. The results displayed in Table 6
Table 6: Changes from 2006 to 2012
for Assistant Professors in 2006
Title Assist Asso Prof Quit Executive Other Wage incr.
Ass. Ln. 0.209 0.414 0.010 0.346 0.017 0.003 1.35
Ass. Pa 0.250 0.233 0.000 0.483 0.035 0.000 1.22
Rows sum to one for the transition matrix. The column Executive corresponds to Ad-
visors, Chair, Dean, Director, Presidence and Provost. The column Other corresponds
to Emeritus, Research Associate and Specialist. Not all categories are represented in
each row.
show that the majority of those who were recruited with a high Pareto
wage, either were not promoted or left MSU. When they stayed, their wage
increase was moderate. However when considering executives positions, we
observe a higher percentage for Pareto wages which is linked with one of
the remarks made in Hamermesh et al. (1982) concerning the opportunity
of an executive administrative task as a mean to get a promotion. On the
contrary, assistant professors who were recruited with a lower lognormal
wage had a much greater chance of being promoted associate professor and
even full professor and had a lower chance of leaving MSU.
We can conclude with this dynamic analysis that the new recruiting
policy which is a mix of high wages and xed term contract was not very
successful, because recruited academics have not so nice perspectives of
promotion and prefer to leave. It would be also interesting to document
the publishing success of these two groups. But for this, we would need
another data base.
5.2 Associate Professors
We t our mixture model with h0 = 130 on our sample of 801 Associate
Professors. On average 737 have a lognormal wage and 64 have a Pareto
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wage. The posterior proportion of high wages is 8%. The posterior means
for wages of the two members of the mixture are respectively $82 493 ($710)
and $148 177 ($4 920). The posterior ratio between the two means is 1.80,
slightly lower than what it was for assistant professors. So, there is still
a high dierence between the two types of wages, but the ratio between
the two has decreased. When comparing the two distributions as displayed
in Figures 1 (assistant professors) and 2 (associate professors), there are
not so many dierences as the two distributions have quite similar shapes.
The model is tting well with a posterior mean Hellinger distance of 0.082
(0.006).
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Figure 2: Posterior predictive wage density for Associate Professors
The contract situation of associate professors reveals to be quite dif-
ferent from that of assistant professors as the importance of xed termed
contracts has decreased dramatically. Associate professors are supposed to
be given the tenure (even if this is not the case for all of them), as shown in
Table 7. The proportion of tenured is 88% for the lognormal sample while
the proportion of xed term contract is only 9%. The situation within the
Pareto sample has changed a lot compared to that of the assistant pro-
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Table 7: Contract types among Associate Professors
Contracts LogNorm Pareto LogNorm Pareto
Numbers Percentage
EM 0 1 0.00 0.02
N 67 18 0.09 0.28
T 650 41 0.88 0.65
TS 21 3 0.03 0.05
Total 737 64 1.00 1.00
N means xed term contract, T means tenured, TS means
tenure system, not yet tenured. EM means executive man-
agement.
Table 8: Changes from 2006 to 2012
for Associate Professors in 2006
Title Assist Asso Prof Endow Quit Exec Wage incr.
Asso. Ln. 0.002 0.504 0.243 0.002 0.198 0.051 1.23
Asso. Pa 0.000 0.375 0.219 0.031 0.203 0.172 1.28
Rows sum to one. The column Executive corresponds to Advisors, Chair, Dean, Di-
rector, Presidence and Provost. The column Other corresponds to Emeritus, Research
Associate and Specialist. Not all categories are represented in each row. Wage cate-
gory (lognormal or Pareto) was determined by averaging inside the Gibbs sampler.
fessor. If only 65% of them have the tenure, the proportion of xed term
contracts has dropped from 59% to 28%.
When we compute the posterior coecient of variation, we have 0.205
(0.006) for the lognormal and 0.257 (0.046) for the Pareto, so that there is
still more inequality in the Pareto member, with this time a probability of
0.89 to nd a higher inequality in the Pareto member. Remember that this
probability was 0.91 for assistant professors. So there is still a higher in-
equality in the Pareto member, but this dierence becomes weaker. There
could still be a phenomenon of superstars, but this fact now becomes ques-
tionable.
The dynamics of status of associate professors is much dierent than
that of assistant professors. There are still dierences of dynamics between
the lognormal and Pareto wages, but these are mainly in term of types
of promotion. The probability to become a full professor or to quit be-
come very similar between the two categories. However, now the lognormal
population has a much higher probability of keeping the same status of
associate professor. In the Pareto sample, those who do not stay associate
get an executive position. Does this now explain the fact that the rate of
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wage increase for the Pareto is now slightly higher?
5.3 Full Professors
We need to go to the status of full professors in order to get a fully dier-
ent picture of wage formation. We tted our model to our population of
1 201 full professors with h0 = 160. Posterior mean wages are respectively
$111 191 ($920) and $175 107 ($4 520) for the two members. The dierence
between these two posterior means is still signicant, but the ratio between
the two has now dropped to 1.6.
All of those who were in the tenure system have now their tenure.
Roughly 5% of those who have a Pareto wage also have an executive labour
contract of the University, while those with a lognormal wage have none.
The presence of these EM contract explains the dierence in the propor-
tion of tenure between the two populations. The proportion of xed term
contracts is now negligible.
Table 9: Contract types among Full Professors
Contracts LogNorm Pareto LogNorm Pareto
Numbers Percentage
EM 2 4 0.00 0.05
N 79 6 0.07 0.08
T 1040 70 0.93 0.87
Total 1121 80 1.00 1.00
N means xed term contract, T means tenured, EM means
executive management.
The coecient of variation is now greater for the lognormal with 0.225
(0.006) than for the Pareto with 0.181 (0.032) so that the probability that
there is more inequality in the Pareto member becomes negligible. The
posterior proportion of Pareto higher wages is 7%, but they can no longer
be qualied of superstar wages as there is denitely less inequality in the
Pareto tail.
The wage distribution of full professors, as displayed in Figure 3, has
now a quite dierent shape than that of the two lower statuses. The model
ts rather well, as the posterior Hellinger distance becomes lower with 0.065
(0.0063). We can thus conclude that at the level of full professors there is
some kind of wage compression. This category is the most represented in
the sample with 1 201 members. This wage compression can be explained
by the fact that we are in a public university. Nevertheless, the American
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Figure 3: Posterior predictive wage density for Full Professors
Association of University Professors reports that for all US Universities
(thus including private universities) all wages increased by 4.2% in nominal
terms over 2006-2007 while for the same period, they increased by only
1.7% for full professors (AAUP 2007).
Considering the 2012-2013 data set, we see in Table 10 that the wage
increase is higher for the Pareto member. However, even if there wage
increase is lower, lognormal professors ensure a lower rate of exit as they
have 27% chances of quitting MSU, while the rate of exit for Pareto wages
is now 33%. Lognormal wages mainly keep the same status (61%). Pareto
wages mostly do not keep the same status (24%). They either become
executive or quit (33%). This is the most striking fact for this population.
Hamermesh et al. (1982) explains this reward as an incentive for professors
to engage in non-scholarly pursuits.
There is a specic category among the full professors which is that
of endowed chairs.
10
Due to their very dierent source of nancing, this
category can be very heterogeneous so that it is dicult to adjust a mixture
10
There are 89 University Distinguished Professors and 84 professors scattered among
24 dierent Endowed Chairs, presumably named after their donator.
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Table 10: Changes from 2006 to 2012 for full professors in 2006
Title Prof Endow Quit Exec Other Wage incr.
Prof. Ln. 0.607 0.034 0.271 0.070 0.019 1.10
Prof. Pa 0.238 0.048 0.333 0.333 0.048 1.22
Rows sum to one. The column Executive corresponds to Advisors, Chair, Dean, Di-
rector, Presidence and Provost. The column Other corresponds to Emeritus, Research
Associate and Specialist. Not all categories are represented in each row.
of two members. Moreover, they are small in numbers, 173 against 1 201.
So we shall now present our full results here. We can still identify two
groups. However, inequality within each group has decreased as the two
coecients of variation have dropped to 0.211 (0.016) for the lognormal
part and to 0.151 (0.034) for the Pareto. So if the Endowed Chairs are
a specic category, wage compression is here even more severe here than
what it is in the category of full professors.
5.4 Academic Wage Formation: A Synthesis
We regroup in Table 11 inference results for the dispersion parameters of
the lognormal and Pareto members for each status, the proportion p of
lognormal wages as well as mean wages for each categories in order to have
an overview.
Table 11: Wage compression for academics
Status Lognormal Pareto p
mean σ CV mean α CV
Assistant 66 821 0.043 0.209 125 076 4.91 0.276 0.93
Associate 82 493 0.041 0.205 148 177 5.13 0.257 0.92
Full 111 191 0.049 0.225 175 107 6.77 0.181 0.93
Endowed 154 016 0.044 0.211 190 047 8.00 0.151 0.69
The lognormal wage corresponds clearly to the tournament theory as
it increases at a greater speed as we climb the ladder. The Pareto wage,
which should correspond to a superstar wage, still increases with the ladder,
but at a much lower speed. The Pareto coecient increases, leading to a
decreasing coecient of variation while the coecient of variation of the
lognormal component uctuates. There is thus a phenomenon of wage
compression for the highest paid professors. There is a kind of invisible
limit in the top wage that can be paid. Starting from the full professor
status, most of the inequality lies in the lognormal part of the distribution.
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So wage dierentiation is not done in the highest part, but in the lowest
part of the distribution. This is a kind of reverse mechanism than the
superstars. If there is a superstar wage policy, it is only at the level of
Assistant and eventually Associate professors. What are the consequences
of such a policy?
To answer this question, we have to look more deeply at the superstars
population that we have identied among the assistant professors. First
of all, the superstars are located in the departments of Business, Finance,
Economics, Management (Bus-Eco) on one side and Medicine, Veterinary
Medicine (Med) on the other side.
Medicine and Vet represent 64% of the sample, Bus-Eco 36%. A simi-
lar percentage of these superstars (12.5%) leave for a better university. So
MSU did not manage to keep these superstars, despite their high wages.
However, this percentage is not so high. In Bus-Eco, 35% are promoted
with tenure while 44% leave for a lower ranked university, presumably be-
cause they did not get the tenure. In Med, the status is mainly xed term.
Only 28% are promoted with the same contract while 33% stayed Assis-
tant professor; 27% take an Outside option. As a conclusion, MSU might
have had large expectations when recruiting superstars, which were disap-
pointed because either they were not promoted or did not get the tenure.
A xed term contract is not a policy instrument for recruiting superstars as
rst there is a negligible percentage with this type of contract among the
Bus-Eco superstars and second because xed term is rule for recruiting all
the assistant professors in Human Medicine. Finally, this type of contract
declines even in Medicine for Associate and Full Professors.
6 Conclusion
European and American public universities have fundamental dierences
in their recruiting system for young professors. American universities have
managed to implement a system where young professors are proposed a mix
between fairly good wages, but accompanied by more precarious contracts.
If this system was quite successful to attract bright researchers, it was not
so successful in keeping them as most of them tried to move to another
university. As we climb up in the hierarchy, this combination between high
wages and precarious contracts is less and less frequent while professors
under this more stable system have more tendency to stay at the same
place where they were recruited. It is as if the budget constraint bearing
on public universities would prevent them from being able to oer superstar
wages at every step of the hierarchical ladder.
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Our empirical study has shown that mixing high wages and precarious
contracts was not an ecient solution. Assistant professors recruited with
a lognormal wage together with the tenured track system have a better
chance of staying. We must however underline that American universities
still can rely on another tool in order to improve their reputation which
could participate to their attractiveness for both students and donators:
sport team which are coached by superstars.
Sport and athletics have a peculiar importance in American Universi-
ties. A prominent athletics program is often the strongest marketing device
that the university has. A team being able to compete at the national level
draws a lot of attention, which brings large benets when it comes to the
point of raising outside money, either public subsidies or private funds.
Michigan State University has an athletic team called the Spartans. It
managed to be quite eective in football, hockey and basketball as it has
won a national title several times. Those teams are led by teams of coaches.
Let us materialise their mean and maximum wages in Table 12 for 2006.
Table 12: Sport coaches in 2006
Title N Mean wage Max wage Gini
Assistant to head coach 3 30 081 33 000 0.048
Associate head coach 7 41 672 53 045 0.086
Head coach 14 64 444 97 850 0.098
Assistant coach 37 78 733 206 000 0.361
Coach 5 257 217 400 000 0.211
N means xed term contract.
This Table reveals huge dierences between the average wage of an as-
sistant to head coach and the maximum wage of a coach. However, coaches
rst share the common characteristics of having a xed term contract and
second they are not very numerous. Top coaches, depending on their role
and performance can earn a lot of money. They are nationwide famous.
For instance, Thomas Izzo is the head men's basketball coach and report
an annual wage of $339 480 in our 2006 data base while John Smith was
the head coach for football and reports an annual wage of $400 000. These
wages are among the highest reported in our data base, much higher than
those of any professors.
11
As they are very few in number, even a public
university can aord this type of wage which be impossible to generalise
to a large number of professors. Should European Universities look in the
11
However these gures are nothing compared to the gures recently reported in the
press (Forbes, May 5, 2012) where Thomas Izzo was reported earning a total of $3.5
millions.
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direction of sport in order to strengthen the links between their members,
both students and professors?
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APPENDIX
A Bayesian Inference for the Hybrid Mixture
A.1 Bayesian Inference for the Lognormal Process
Density and moments of the lognormal distribution were given above. The
likelihood function is conveniently written as follows in order to have a nice
combination with the prior:
L(µ, σ2|x) =
(
n∏
i=1
(xi)
−1
)
(2pi)−n/2σ−n exp− 1
2σ2
n∑
i=1
(log xi − µ)2
∝ σ−n exp− 1
2σ2
∑
i
(log xi − µ)2
∝ σ−n exp− 1
2σ2
(
s2 + n(µ− x¯)2) , (11)
where
x¯ =
1
n
∑
i
log xi s
2 =
1
n
∑
i
(log xi − x¯))2
are two sucient statistics. We can neglect the Jacobian (
∏n
i=1 (xi)
−1),
as Bayesian inference in the log normal process proceeds in the same way
as for the usual normal process, see e.g. Lubrano and Ndoye (2016). In
particular, we have natural conjugate prior densities for µ and σ2. We
select a conditional normal prior on µ|σ2 and an inverted gamma2 prior on
σ2:
pi(µ|σ2) = fN(µ|µ0, σ2/n0) ∝ σ−1 exp− n0
2σ2
(µ− µ0)2, (12)
pi(σ2) = fiγ(σ
2|ν0, s0) ∝ σ−(ν0+2) exp− s0
2σ2
. (13)
The prior moments are easily derived from the formulae given in Appendix
A of Bauwens et al. (1999):
E(µ|σ2) = E(µ) = µ0, Var(µ|σ2) = 1
n0
σ2 Var(µ) =
1
n0
s0
ν0 − 2 ,(14)
E(σ2) =
s0
ν0 − 2 , Var(σ
2) =
s20
(ν0 − 2)2(ν0 − 4) . (15)
Let us now combine the prior with the likelihood function to obtain the joint
posterior probability density function of (µ, σ2) in such a way that we can
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isolate the conditional and marginal posterior density of the parameters:
pi(µ, σ2|x) ∝ σ−(n+ν0+3) exp− 1
2σ2
(
s0 + s
2 + n (µ− x¯)2 + n0(µ− µ0)2
)
.
As we are in the natural conjugate framework, we can identify the param-
eters of the product of an inverted gamma2 in σ2 by a conditional normal
density in µ|σ2. After some algebraic manipulations, the conditional nor-
mal posterior of the latter is:
pi(µ|σ2, x) ∝ σ−1 exp− 1
2σ2
((n0µ0 + nx¯)/n∗) ,
∝ fN(µ|µ∗, σ2/n∗),
with
n∗ = n0 + n, µ∗ = (n0µ0 + nx¯)/n∗.
Then the marginal posterior density of µ is Student with
pi(µ|x) = ft(µ|µ∗, s∗, n∗, ν∗),
∝ [s∗ + n∗(µ− µ∗)2]−(ν∗+1)/2, (16)
where
ν∗ = ν0 + n, s∗ = s0 + s
2 +
n0n
n0 + n
(µ0 − x¯)2.
The posterior density of σ2 is given by:
pi(σ2|x) ∝ σ−(n+ν0+2) exp− 1
2σ2
(
s0 + s
2 +
n0n
n0 + n
(µ0 − x¯)2
)
,
∝ fiγ(σ2|ν∗, s∗). (17)
The posterior densities of µ and σ2 belong to well known families. Their
moments are obtained analytically and no numerical integration is neces-
sary.
A.2 Bayesian Inference for the Pareto Process
Density and moments of the Pareto distribution were given above. The
two sucient statistics are min(x) and
∑
log(xi/h). Bayesian inference,
as provided by Arnold (2008) requires a Gibbs sampler. As a matter of
fact, the Pareto process does not belong to the exponential family, but
conditionally on h or conditionally on α, it does. So it is possible to nd
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natural conjugate priors for α and h, provided we write the likelihood
function in the following form:
L(x;α, h) = αn exp
{
−(α + 1)
∑
log(xi) + αn log(h)
}
1(x(1) > h).
Following Arnold and Press (1983), we propose to use an independent prior
p(α, h) = p(α)p(h). When h is known, log(x/h) is distributed according to
an exponential distribution, so that the natural conjugate prior for α is the
Gamma density with ν0 degrees of freedom and as scale parameter α0:
p(α|ν0, α0) ∝ αν0−1 exp(−αα0), E(α) = ν0/α0,Var(α) = ν0/α20.
The conditional posterior of α given h is:
p(α|h, x) ∝ αn+ν0−1 exp−α(
∑
log(xi) + α0 − n log(h)).
This is a Gamma density G(α∗, ν∗) with:
ν∗ = ν0 + n α∗ = α0 +
∑
log(xi/h).
When α is known, the conjugate prior for h is a Power function with shape
parameter γ0 and scale parameter h0:
p(h|γ0, h0) = γ0 h−γ00 hγ0−11(h < h0).
The conditional posterior of h given α is obtained by neglecting all the ele-
ments which are independent of h in the product of the likelihood function
times the prior:
p(xm|x, α) ∝ xαn+γ0−1m 1(xm < xi)1(h < h0).
We identify a Power function density PF(γ∗, h∗) with parameters:
γ∗ = γ0 + nα h∗ = max(min(xi), h0).
We note that the support of the conditional posterior density h∗ depends
on the minimum value of the sample and on the value of h0. Collecting
these results, inference on α and h is conducted using a Gibbs sampler as
we do not know the expression of the joint posterior density of α and h.
34
A.3 A Gibbs Sampler
The implementation of the inference procedure for the mixture is provided
by the following Gibbs sampler algorithm:
• Choose prior values for the lognormal (µ0, n0) (normal) , (s0, ν0) (in-
verted gamma2)
• Choose prior values for the Pareto (α0, τ0) (gamma) , (γ0, xm0) (power
function)
• Choose prior values for the Dirichlet (n10, n20)
• Initialise the prior probability Pr(zi = 1)
• Draw z = 1(U < Pr(zi = 1)) where U is a uniform of dimension n
• Estimate p as n1/(n1 + n2)
• Initialise: α = α0, h = h0
• Start the Gibbs loop
 Compute the sucient statistics for the rst lognormal member
and the second Pareto member
 Combine the sucient statistics with the prior parameters
 Draw p as a Beta random variable
 Draw σ2 from an IG2
 Draw µ|σ2 from a normal
 Draw α|h from a gamma
 Draw h|α from a power function
 Store the draws
• Ends the Gibbs loop
• Compute summary statistics
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A.4 Prior Information
We have tried to use an identical prior information for the dierent mixture
members, except of course for h. For the prior of the lognormal member,
we have chosen for µ
mu0 =
1
n
∑
log(x), n0 = 1,
and for σ2
s0 = 0.5, ν0 = 5.
The prior information on µ is sample based (which is often the case for
mixtures), but its prior standard deviation can be made large with the
prior on σ2.
For the prior on p, we choose 5 and 1 as the degrees of freedom of the
Beta prior, which means a prior expectation of 0.83. The prior on h is a
power function. h0 was specic to each category and was determined by the
shape of a non-parametric estimate of the wage density. The value chosen
for h0 corresponded to the location of a bump in the graph, bump where
a Pareto member could start. The other parameter of the power function
was set equal to 1. For the gamma prior on α, the Pareto coecient, we
chose
α0 = 1, ν0 = 4
which corresponds to a prior expectation of 4. To run the Gibbs sampler,
we discarded the rst 5 000 draws to warm the chain and then kept the
next 5 000 draws. In order to ease the presentation of the results and the
graphs, we shall divide all the annual wages by 1 000, which means that
the unit will be in thousands of dollars.
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